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abstract: The notion of ontology originates in philosophy . It has been recently em-
ployed in computer science and information technology for representing knowledge . 
In the first part of the paper, I argue that there is a significant overlap in these notions 
of ontology . utilizing this overlap, I show in the second part that ontologies can be 
used for developing a new powerful heuristic method for resolving verbal disputes 
in philosophy . Verbal disputes can be defined in terms of ontologies: A dispute over 
two texts P and S is verbal if and only if both of them can be mapped into the same 
ontology . In the appendix, I analyze the dispute over logical pluralism and indicate 
how my method of resolving verbal disputes can be employed .
key words: Agreement, alignment, conflict, disagreement, logical pluralism, match-
ing, ontology, verbal dispute .
Introduction
The expression “ontology” has been used in a philosophical sense for the 
study of the nature of being, existence, and reality . I will take ontology pri-
marily in its Aristotelian sense, as the study of categories of being . Ontology 
is, however, used in a different sense in computer science and information 
technology for representing the knowledge of a source domain and mak-
ing it easily retrievable, surveyable, combinable, and especially susceptible 
to automatic processing . One of the main assumptions of this paper is that 
– apart from obvious etymological and historical affinities – these contempo-
rary senses are compatible with each other .
First, in its more formal philosophical sense, ontology is the aspect of 
metaphysics aiming to characterize reality by identifying all of its essential 
categories and setting forth the relations among them . This Aristotelian ac-
count has been contested by recent philosophers of the analytic tradition, 
most notably by Carnap (1950) and Quine (1951; 1960; 1970) . Carnap 
argued that so-called external questions concerning the nature of existence or 
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essential categories are not questions about reality, but rather practical ques-
tions about whether or not to accept linguistic forms describing these cat-
egories and the relations among them . Once accepted, ontological sentences 
within a linguistic framework are trivial and meaningless outside of it . Quine, 
by his argument against the distinction between analytic and synthetic sen-
tences, undermines, in fact, the distinction between a linguistic framework 
and its content . The consequence of adopting this strategy is ontological rela-
tivity, i .e . the thesis that ontology is relative to language .
Second, the notion of ontology was introduced into information science 
in the 1970s by researchers in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) . These 
researchers had been interested in the nature of human reasoning rather than 
in the nature of reality .1 The meaning of ontology shifted in the early 1990s 
toward more content based models: Ontology in information science aims to 
represent the knowledge of a source domain .
There have been several efforts to bring these two notions closer to each 
other . Hirsch (1993) introduced the notion of soft ontology which has later 
been used in information science (Collao et al . 2003) . Another line of think-
ing has focused on the notion of naïve physics (Smith and Casati 1994) . I 
would like to propose a rather deflationary account of the distinction be-
tween the philosophical and the information science notion of ontology .
I want to restrict the source domain to texts and philosophical texts espe-
cially . Ontology aims, then, to represent the knowledge about a philosophi-
cal text in a possibly surveyable form . Such an ontology itself is, however, 
represented by an ontology language like RDF/OWL .2 A particular ontology 
is represented by a text and we may ask what the ontology of this text is . By 
iterating this idea we may then arrive at something which may be considered 
a hierarchy of ontologies:3
(1) reality,
(2) an ontologicalp text about reality, i .e . about (1),
(3) a description of the ontologyt1 of (2),
(4) a description of the ontologyt2 of (3),
(5) a description of the ontologyt3 of (4),
(6) …
1 See Guarino (1995) for an overview .
2 Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a data model for modeling entities and 
their properties and relationships . These elements are combined to make simple statements in 
term of triples: subject – predicate – object . Web Ontology Language (OWL) is an extension 
of RDF allowing a description of ontologies . It adds vocabulary for classes, relations between 
classes, properties of relationships etc . It can express first order predicate logic statements and 
inferences between them .
3 To avoid confusion, I label an ontology in the philosophical sense as an ontologyp and 
an ontology of a text as an ontologyt .
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The aim of an ontologyt1 is to survey a text which presents ontologyp which 
describes the nature of reality . The aim of an ontologyt1 is to highlight an on-
tologyp . The aim of an ontologyt2 is to highlight the ontology of the text de-
scribing the ontologyt1 . The aim of an ontologyt3 is to highlight the ontology 
of the text describing the ontologyt2 etc .4 How are these ontologies related 
to each other? A natural requirement for any construction of a text ontologyt 
could be that such a text ontologyt preserves the ontological commitments of 
the text . Then the ontology of (2) has to be included in the ontology of (3), 
or more generally, the ontology of (n) has to be contained in the ontology of 
(n+1) . The upper level ontology (n+1) can extend the ontology (n) by ele-
ments of the ontology language itself (individuals, concepts, relations, classes 
etc .) . In order to stop this infinite hierarchy of ontologiest, we have to build 
the upper ontologyt (n+1) in such way that it is equal to the ontologyt (n) . 
It is a natural requirement of text encoding to make a given text surveyable 
and accessible without modifying it . An upper level ontology, ideally, should 
not add anything new to the text . This requirement is sometimes difficult to 
meet, because formal language need some means of representation of a given 
domain .
To sum up, the formal ontologyt (3) extends the informal ontologyp 
(2) . All the ontologiest are collapsing into a single ontologyt . Our hierarchy 
is now:
(1) reality,
(2) an ontologicalp text about reality, i .e . about (1),
(3) a formal ontologyt of (2) .
This collapse of the hierarchy happens regardless of adopting either the 
Carnapian or the Quinean conception of language and ontology described 
above . Moreover, we can omit the language of ontologyp and say that ontolo-
gyt itself describes the nature of reality . In other words, there is no ontological, 
but only an ontic difference in these ontological texts . If the question as to 
which ontology (language) we adopt is a practical one, it is reasonable to 
pick the language that presents the most surveyable knowledge of the source 
domain . under this practical perspective we can say that the formal language 
that makes the text most surveyable is the language that best captures the 
ontologyp of the text . This claim is the most important presupposition of my 
argument which is going to be presented in the next sections .
4 This model is not opened up for branching, i .e . for the possibility of having compet-
ing ontologies on the same level (an ontologyt3a and an ontologyt3b) . Here I assume a linear 
hierarchy of ontologies of a single text . Branching and competing ontologies are introduced 
by competing interpretations of the original text . This text has to be extended by adding this 
or that interpretation (which has a textual form) . Competing ontologies are based on (partly) 
different texts .
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1. Backbone ontology
The previous section was indifferent to the question of whether we adopt the 
Carnapian or the Quinean conception of language . The hierarchy of ontolo-
gies collapses in both cases . The resulting ontology will, however, be different 
with regard to these two conceptions of language . If we accepted the distinc-
tion between a linguistic framework and its content, the resulting ontology 
would involve a backbone ontology and its content . The notion of a backbone 
ontology is crucial here . A backbone ontology aims to capture everything that 
belongs to the representation framework . A backbone ontology consists of “bed-
rock”5 concepts, their relations, truths involving these concepts (i .e . axioms) 
and perhaps other classes .6 In the Carnapian setting, the formal ontologyt of 
(2) consists of the ontologyp of (1) plus a backbone ontology . I would like to 
point out several problematic questions and indicate possible answers as well .
(1) We can ask simple questions: Should this or that entity be part of 
the backbone ontology? We can include all entities defined in OWL and 
add some entities defined in ISO 704:2009 Terminology work – Principles 
and methods, e .g . some individual and general concepts, and concept rela-
tions . We can further specify the types of concept relations according to ISO 
087–1:2000 . Or we can draw on a concept relation typology as suggested in 
(Nuopponen 2014) . Accordingly, we can ask whether we need intensional re-
lations (based on concept characteristics) in addition to extensional relations 
(based on concept extensions) .
(2) Can a backbone ontology become a subject of (philosophical) dis-
pute? The question whether we can allow intensional concepts is an impor-
tant (and yet unresolved) philosophical dispute . Or so it seems . My question 
would be rather whether this philosophical dispute can be reduced to the 
choice of a backbone ontology . If a backbone ontology becomes a subject of 
philosophical dispute, it would involve a language which gives us a perspec-
tive on this ontology . Then, however, we would run towards a hierarchy of 
ontologies which eventually would collapse back .
5 The notion of bedrock originates in later Wittgenstein: “If I have exhausted the justifi-
cations I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned .” (1958: §217) Bedrock concepts are 
invariants within a given language-game (i .e . in the given context) . This is not incompatible 
with their alteration in another language-game . Chalmers takes the bedrock concept to be “a 
concept so basic that there is no hope of clarifying [it] in more basic terms” (2011: Sec . 7) . We 
have reached bedrock in a dispute when our vocabulary is exhausted . 
6 If an ontology is encoded in OWL, the backbone ontology would include all the enti-
ties of OWL (“Class”, “ObjectProperty”, “DataProperty”, “Datatype”, “Individual”, “Literal”), 
the relations between and the operations on them (e .g ., “SubClassOf”, “DataComplemen-
tOf”, “ObjectIntersectionOf” etc .), and axiom declarations (“Declaration”, “ObjectProper-
tyAxiom”, “ClassAxiom”, “Assertion” etc .) .
11J . MÁCHA: Competing Ontologies and Verbal Disputes
(3) Are all backbone ontologies of the same value? I .e ., is ontological 
relativism true?
(4) These questions lead us to the following one: What criteria could 
help us to prefer one backbone ontology over another one? Ontologies in 
information science were designed for heuristic purposes . The heuristic cri-
teria can perhaps be helpful in this framework too . The aim of this paper is 
to develop a heuristic method for solving philosophical disputes or more pre-
cisely for deciding whether a philosophical dispute is a verbal one . It would 
be natural to prefer such a backbone ontology that helps us to decide over this 
or that philosophical dispute .
(5) Does any privileged backbone ontology exist? If the dispute over dif-
ferent backbone ontologies is not possible, the backbone ontology we actu-
ally possess (e .g . the ontology of our language) would become the privileged 
one . There is the worry, however, that an affirmative answer to this question 
would bring us back to Aristotelian realism . Another answer could be that 
we would prefer such a backbone ontology that as much as possible helps us 
to resolve philosophical disputes . So we can strive for a domain-independent 
backbone ontology suitable for all philosophical disputes or design a domain-
dependent backbone ontology for this or that dispute .
(6) What sorts of truths can a backbone ontology comprise? E .g . ob-
servational truths (as Carnap suggested), the most “general facts about our 
nature” (Wittgenstein’s suggestion), normative truths (a Kantian suggestion), 
causal truths, etc .
Adopting the Quinean holistic picture, no privileged structure is pos-
sible . There would be no backbone ontology in a strict sense . A Quinean 
ontology would become a linked web of expressions including sentences and 
words, none of them being privileged there . This would, however, undermine 
the very notion of ontology as a hierarchical structure . To avoid this concern, 
we might follow a suggestion made by Chalmers (2011: Sect . 7) saying that 
the Quinean scholar “may still be entitled to the notion of a bedrock family 
of concepts” . Some of these families may constitute the backbone ontology; 
other concepts and concept families are then dependent on this (tailored) 
backbone ontology .7
7 This hypothesis resembles Wittgenstein’s notion of a language-game in several respects: 
(1) language-games have an internal structure; (2) there are horizontal relations between lan-
guage-games (one language-game is based on another one); (3) language-games are, like on-
tologies, primarily heuristic tools . The view derived from Quine allows for suggesting local 
ontologies which can be described as hierarchical structures within a global holistic picture . 
We could alternatively speak of three conceptions of language: Carnapian, Wittgensteinian 
and Quinean .
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2. Verbal disputes
One of the most prominent topics in contemporary (meta)philosophy is the 
problem of verbal disputes and disagreement (see Hirsch (2005; 2009), Sider 
(2006), Chalmers (2011), Jenkins (2014)) . The idea is that some philosophi-
cal disputes which seem at first glance substantive, important and somehow 
deep, can reveal that they are actually disputes over the meanings of some of 
the involved terms . The main challenge in this deflationist line of thinking 
is to distinguish substantive disputes from verbal disputes . See the seminal 
definition of verbal dispute8 by David Chalmers (2011: 522):
A dispute over [sentence] S is (broadly) verbal when for some expression T in S, 
the parties disagree about the meaning of T, and the dispute over S arises wholly 
in virtue of this disagreement regarding T .
A dispute is resolved if it is identified as a verbal dispute .9 But how do we find 
out that a prima facie substantive dispute is the verbal one? Chalmers provides 
a heuristic method of locating the expression T whose meaning the parties 
disagree with . Chalmers calls this heuristic method the method of elimination . 
The method proceeds as follows: In order to find out whether a dispute over 
S is verbal with respect to T, one eliminates the term T from the vocabulary 
and tries to find the sentence S’ such that the parties disagree over S’, and 
such that the disagreement over S’ is part of the dispute over S . If there is no 
such S’, the dispute is verbal . The method also aims to eliminate all the terms 
from S that do not cause the verbal character of the dispute over S .
In the view derived from Carnap, the method will sooner or later reach 
a bedrock concept which cannot then be eliminated . Then the dispute is 
not verbal and we can ask the questions from the previous section . In the 
Quinean setting, there is no privileged stopping point . The method may be 
iterated, unless a verbal character of the dispute will be discovered or one runs 
out of vocabulary .
Chalmers’ definition of a verbal dispute is restricted to one sentence and 
is parameterized by one particular expression occurring in the sentence . I want 
to propose a generalized definition of a verbal dispute which takes into ac-
count several sentences (a text) and is not parameterized by any expression:
A dispute over two texts or two sets of sentences P and S is verbal if and 
only if both sets can be mapped into the same ontology .
8 Several authors have recently proposed various definitions of verbal disputes and their 
cognates: merely, broadly, narrowly verbal etc . I will briefly comment on the proposals by 
Hirsch (2005) and Sider (2006) .
9 A verbal dispute is still a dispute over a meaning of some expression . To put it differ-
ently, verbal disputes concern language, substantial disputes concern what language is about .
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The idea behind this definition is that the texts or sentences are first 
represented by or mapped into formal ontologies that are subsequently com-
pared . If there is any disagreement between these texts, it should be rendered 
as a disagreement between the ontologies representing these texts . We have to 
clarify the two main concepts involved in this definition: (1) How a text can 
be mapped into an ontology? (2) How do we compare two ontologies in order 
to determine whether they are the same or whether they disagree?
As to the first point, building a textual ontology is a creative process that 
involves interpreting the text (as opposed to engineering a backbone ontology 
that should be open for any further interpretation) . Mapping a text into an 
ontology cannot do without also interpreting the text . Ontologies, thus, rep-
resent the given text together with its particular interpretation . Therefore, 
agreement or disagreement over different ontologies involves agreement or 
disagreement over different interpretations .
It seems therefore that Chalmers’ definition does not involve such a 
mapping and hence it does not involve any interpretation of the two sen-
tences . But this is not so . The parties may disagree about the sentence S as 
a result of their different interpretations of S (or of some expressions in S) . 
Roughly speaking, an interpretation is basically an assignment of meaning . If 
the disagreement comes about only in virtue of the disagreement in interpre-
tations, the dispute is verbal . Hence, verbal disputes always involve different 
interpretations . Chalmers’ definition reduces differences in interpretations 
to disagreement over the meaning of a single expression T . The aim of my 
definition is to allow for more complex patterns of disagreement .
Furthermore, the underlying backbone ontology might not be rich 
enough in order to capture all the substantial differences between the two 
texts . On the other hand, the ontologies might be too complex, so there 
would be no advantage in comparing them over the comparing of the origi-
nal texts (which is what Chalmers does) . There is a kind of trade-off . Hence 
ontology engineers have to reach the middle ground between too simple and 
too complex ontologies . This consideration thus applies to all employment 
of textual ontologies after all .
As to the second point, we have to clarify the notion of sameness or 
difference between two ontologies . The sets S and P do not need to lead to 
strictly the same ontology . It is crucial here that there must be no disagreement 
between these ontologies in order to proclaim the dispute as a verbal one . But 
sameness is not equal to the absence of disagreement . Therefore, we have to 
focus on the notion of disagreement . The presence of logical contradiction is 
not the only type of disagreement in ontologies (d’Aquin 2009) . Disagreement 
in ontologies may arise on two levels: There might be disagreement in enti-
ties or disagreement in statements . Coping with disagreement in entities is 
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the problem of ontology matching (Shvaiko and Euzenat 2013) . Agreement 
in entities means in Quinean terms that both sets of sentences have the same 
ontological commitments . Any agreement or disagreement in statements pre-
supposes (at least partial) agreement in entities . If two ontologies completely 
disagree in entities, they cover different domains and there cannot be any 
agreement or disagreement .
Based on these considerations we can make our definition more precise:
A dispute over S and P is verbal if, given their mapping in ontologies, (1) both 
sets have the same ontological commitments (i .e . there is agreement in entities), 
and (2) every statement from P follows from S and every statement from S fol-
lows from P (i .e . there is agreement in statements) .
When trying to resolve a dispute, it might occur that a conflicting 
statement concerning a bedrock concept is found . As stated above, bedrock 
concepts cannot be defined in terms of other concepts; they are part of the 
backbone ontology . Let me give an example . Let S and P be theories in first-
order predicate logic . S contains quantifiers that range over the individuals 
(of a universe) whereas P contains in addition to it quantifiers that range over 
functions or terms that have such individuals as their values . Now, when try-
ing to resolve a disagreement between S and P, one may reach the point that 
the parties would disagree over the question whether the ontology contains 
intensional concepts or it does not . This is, however, the matter of the back-
bone ontology . This question has to be decided before we try to resolve the 
dispute over S and P . Which backbone ontology is taken is something that 
the parties have to agree on before they start to resolve their dispute . They 
may, however, come to the diagnosis that their backbone ontology is not 
philosophically neutral . In this case, one dispute is reduced to another, which 
is a kind of progress . But we still do not know whether the dispute is a verbal 
one . We have to build a more general backbone ontology that will be philo-
sophically neutral to the problem in question . Within this general backbone 
ontology, we can pose questions over whether some entities can be reduced 
to other . Hence, to continue in our example, the question whether there 
is a need for intensional entities becomes the question whether intensional 
entities are reducible to first-order entities . If so, they can be subsequently 
eliminated from the backbone ontology . We have to, so to speak, in order to 
achieve a philosophical neutrality, build a maximal ontology which can be 
subsequently reduced to its bedrock elements .
1.1. Disputes in term of ontologies are more general
The sets S and P may differ only in one sentence . If set P contained only one 
sentence and set S its negation, we would have arrived at Chalmers’ scenario . 
The definition of verbal dispute proposed here is, however, more general than 
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the one proposed by Chalmers . Consider, for instance, that both the sets P 
and S contain the expressions T1 and T2 . The meanings of T1 and T2 are not 
independent from each other, i .e . T1 occurs in the definition of T2, and T2 
occurs in the definition of T1 . Their meanings are, however, swapped, i .e . 
when T1 has in P the same meaning as T2 in S and T2 has in P the same mean-
ing as T1 is S . Disagreement over P and S is clearly verbal and can be handled 
by the techniques of ontology matching . According to Chalmers’ definition, 
the dispute over P and S still does not need to be verbal, because we cannot 
guarantee that after eliminating, say, T1, we will be able to eliminate T2 as 
well . Such a case occurs when T2 can be defined only by using the expres-
sion T1 which, however, has been already eliminated from the vocabulary . 
After eliminating T1, we have reached the point of vocabulary exhaustion . 
This means that both T1 and T2 are bedrock concepts, they belong to the 
backbone ontology . This scenario is possible only in the Quinean conception 
of language/ontology10 (in the Carnapian conception, such circular defini-
tions are not possible) . We thus have an example of a bedrock dispute that is 
nevertheless intuitively verbal . Chalmers, however, in contrast, claims that “a 
bedrock dispute is a substantive dispute for which no underlying dispute can 
be found by the method of elimination” (2011: 545) .
I see in my definition two main advantages over Chalmers’ one: (1) It is 
able to handle the Carnapian as well as the Quinean conception of language/
ontology . What we have to do is compare the ontology of P with the ontol-
ogy of S . In the Quinean view, there are verbal disputes where the parties do 
not disagree about the meaning of any particular term exclusively, but they 
can disagree over the whole web (the subject of their disagreement is spread 
throughout the context) . The scenario described in the previous paragraph is 
such a case . Chalmers (ibid: 549) admits to not having any conclusive argu-
ments against holistic opponents . (2) Second: If verbal disputes are defined 
in terms of ontologies, algorithmic heuristic methods as well as methods of 
automatic processing are available to solve them . This becomes a significant 
advantage over Chalmers’ method of elimination which amounts to a step-by-
step checking of the expressions from S as to whether this or that expression 
is responsible for the possible verbal character of the dispute .
These two points bring us to the competing characterizations of verbal 
disputes given by Hirsch (2005) and Sider (2006) . They are based on the 
notion of the charitable interpretation and the translation respectively . Hirsch 
(2005: 72) defines verbal disputes as follows:
The general characterization of a verbal dispute is one in which the controver-
sial sentences are most plausibly interpreted as having different truth conditions 
10 A meaning holist might say that the more similar the meanings of T1 and T2 are, the 
more this dispute is being verbal .
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in the different languages associated with the contending positions, so that each 
position turns out to be correct in its associated language .
Sider, although his approach differs in particular details, uses the similar 
notion of the translation . A dispute is verbal if one can translate everything 
that the one party says into the language of the other party and vice versa so 
that both parties accept the corresponding sentences (Sider 2006; Chalmers 
2011: 556, fn . 26) .
Chalmers criticized Sider’s definition that “in cases involving bedrock 
expressions, one cannot infer similarity or difference in content from similar-
ity or difference in these inferential roles” (ibid) . But following the ontology 
based account advanced here, one can diagnose the similarity or difference of 
these expressions by techniques of ontology matching . Even if there is no ex-
plicit definition for a bedrock expression, it must have a corresponding place 
in the ontology and this place is determined by its relations to other entities 
within the ontology . We do not need to involve inferential roles here . Hence, 
if we apply these two definitions by Hirsch and Sider onto our scenario with 
the swapped meanings of T1 and T2, the dispute would be identified as verbal 
(the translation manual would be very simple) . More generally, Hirsch and 
Sider would also identify some disputes in backbone ontology as verbal .
What is, however, lacking in their proposals – in contrast to Chalmers’ 
and mine – is a (general) method of evaluating disputes .11 The definitions 
of a verbal dispute by Hirsch and Sider are nominal (in Locke’s sense) . The 
definition proposed here is a real one, for it gives a method how to find out 
whether there are mutual translations or charitable interpretations between 
the disagreeing parties .
1.2. Techniques for resolving verbal disputes 
with the help of ontologies
I want to conclude this section with an overview of the available techniques 
in resolving verbal disputes with the help of ontologies . The process of re-
solving philosophical disputes will never be a fully automatic process as there 
will never be a fully automatized argumentation . Ontologies can be used, 
however, to formalize the argumentation taking place in ontology engineer-
ing processes . Hence, in order to find out whether two ontologies agree or 
disagree, we can employ, for example, Argumentation Ontologies based on the 
IBIS argumentation model (Tempich et al . 2005) . In such a scenario, we 
can take disagreeing agents and build the same ontology over the union of S 
11 Sider concludes his paper by claiming that “Constructing translations with the right 
inferential roles is a non-trivial task .” (2006: 95)
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and P . Their success will indicate that the dispute was verbal . If they do not 
succeed, their disagreement typically does not affect the whole ontology, but 
only some of its parts . So even a failure to build a single ontology will help 
the agents to locate where exactly their disagreement lies .
Ontology Blending (Hois et al . 2010) is another technique that may help 
in resolving disputes . Suppose the agents have already built their ontologies 
over S and P . Since these sets may be distinct, but covering the same domain, 
the resulting ontologies may be conceptually different, they must nevertheless 
be structurally similar . This means there will be a substantial disagreement in 
entities . Ontology blending allows the combining of two thematically differ-
ent ontologies to create an ontology describing a newly created domain . This 
is typical in philosophy where overcoming two competing interpretations in 
a creative process leads to a new interpretation .
Another approach is Multi-Connected Ontologies (Davies et al . 2011) . It 
suggests a way in which different ontologies can be connected together into a 
larger multi-connected ontology . Ontologies are represented mathematically 
as ordered trees . Then for two ontologies to be identical, they must agree in 
entities, though not necessary in statements linking these entities . This is 
so because two trees of equal number of nodes but different links could be 
combined into a single tree .
3. Case study: the dispute over logical pluralism
In this supplementary section I would like to illustrate the framework sketched 
above . I deliberately avoid examples that are paradigmatic in the context of 
discussing verbal disputes like the disputes over free will, physicalism, the ex-
istence of abstract objects, mereological sums, temporal parts – partly because 
these disputes are rather over-discussed and partly because I would like to 
give an example of a dispute where the account of verbal disputes given here 
makes a difference . Disputes in logic take usually the form of the question 
whether one logical system is preferable over another logical system . Except 
for a logical realist, these disputes are about the meanings of the terms that 
are involved . Carnap said famously in his principle of tolerance: “Everyone is 
at liberty to build his own logic, i .e . his own language, as he wishes .” (1937: 
§17) Intuitively, not all disputes in logic are unsubstative . The definition of 
a verbal dispute advanced in this essay allows for substantial, i .e . non-verbal 
disputes that are about the meanings . Furthermore, logical systems are par-
simonious, they do not usually contain redundant expressions . Hence, no 
expression can be easily eliminated from a given logical system . Chalmers’ 
method of elimination would immediately reach the point of vocabulary ex-
haustion and, thus, classify every dispute in logic as substantial .
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Let us adjust the scenario with the swapped meanings of T1 and T2 to 
a dispute in logic . Let us have two systems of propositional logic, P and 
S . There are only two logical connectives in each of them, one unary and 
one binary . In P, “not” stands for propositional negation and “con” stands 
for propositional conjunction . In S, the meanings of “not” and “con” are 
swapped, i .e . “not” stands for conjunction and “con” stands for negation . The 
dispute over whether P is preferable to S is intuitively verbal . It is classified as 
a verbal one according to the definitions of Sider and Hirsch, because there 
are (trivial) translation rules between S and P . The dispute is also verbal ac-
cording to the definition advanced here, for in the corresponding ontologies 
the arity of the connectives must be preserved, i .e . the unary connectives in 
P have to match with the unary connectives in S and the binary connectives 
in P have to match with the binary connectives in S . Chalmers’ method of 
elimination is of no use here, for we cannot eliminate either of the connec-
tives .12 The upshot is that according to Chalmers’ definition, the dispute over 
P and S would be classified as a substantial one .
Let us turn to the less trivial cases of disputes in logic. Logical plural-
ism says that there are more correct logical systems. Logical monism says 
that there is only one correct logical system. From the quotation above it 
follows that Carnap was an advocate of logical pluralism (and that this 
dispute is essentially over the choice of a language of logic). Let us ex-
clude the trivial cases in which the parties disagree over the meanings of 
“logic” and “correct” (cf. Russell 2014). Let us exclude also the rather 
opaque cases of logics determined by cultural or biological factors (like 
a female logic, a bourgeoisie logic, a Buddhist logic etc.). What is now 
meant by the competing logics are rather systems such as intuitionistic, 
paraconsistent, paracomplete, or quantum logic. The dispute over logical 
pluralism comes on two levels. There is a meta-dispute as to the question 
of whether there are more correct logical systems, or whether there is only 
one. If there is only one correct logical system, we can the ask which one 
it is among the given alternatives. Beall and Restall (2006) argue for an 
even more radical version of Carnap’s pluralism. The opposite view, logi-
cal monism, has been advocated by Priest (2006, 2008). The dispute over 
logical pluralism usually take the form of a dispute about the relation of 
logical consequence. Pluralists claim that there can be different instances 
of logical consequence that disagree in at least one case. For classical or 
intuitionistic logic, the disjunctive syllogism P ∨ Q, ¬Q ⊨ P is a valid 
12 One may argue that we can eliminate both the connectives in favor of a universal con-
nective like the Sheffer stroke . But this connective is, by presupposition, not available in the 
original logical systems, and the method of elimination does not count with any possibility of 
introducing new terms into vocabulary .
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case of logical consequence, whereas it does not hold in paraconsistent 
logic. The rule of double negation elimination ¬¬P ⊨ P is valid in clas-
sical logic, but it is not in intuitionistic logic. Now, if it turns out that the 
dispute over different cases of logical consequence were verbal, then logi-
cal pluralism would not be a distinctive position and the meta-dispute over 
it would be verbal too.
One line of argument facing this problem is to insist that the disagree-
ment comes in virtue of the meanings of the logical connectives that are 
involved here – as Priest (2006: 171 & 204) seems to argue . If so, we can em-
ploy the method of resolving disputes by their mapping into ontologies . Of 
course, the disagreement between, for example, classical logic and intuitionist 
logic is more complicated than our case of swapped meanings . But to make 
the case for the claim that the disagreement arises in virtue of the meanings of 
logical connectives involves presenting translation rules for these connectives . 
Mapping into ontologies can facilitate this task .
If one manages to show that disputes over these logical systems are verbal 
with a help of mapping into ontologies, they can employ the strategy of step-
ping into a more general backbone ontology as indicated above . There may 
be a more general system that allows us to decide which logic is appropriate 
for this or that sort of situation or reasoning context . Priest (2008: 213) in-
dicates indeed that what we need to do is “stepping back and looking at the 
bigger picture .” The logic of this bigger picture must allow for local incon-
sistencies . This argument leads to favorizing Priest’s own paraconsistent logic: 
“Some paraconsistent mechanism must get in on the act .” (ibid)
We can say in conclusion that the method of resolving disputes by their 
mapping into ontologies does not offer any easy solutions . To map a compli-
cated philosophical dispute into an ontology is a fussy work which can em-
ploy various techniques as mentioned in Sect . 2 .2 . Mappings into ontologies 
can be, however, a powerful method of philosophical reasoning .13
13 The author would like to thank Alois Pichler, Deirdre Smith and various audiences at 
FOIS 2014 (Rio de Janeiro), the university of Zagreb and the university of Bergen for illumi-
nating discussions . A special thank goes to the anonymous reviewers of Prolegomena .
20 Prolegomena 16 (1) 2017
Bibliography
Collao, A . Jr ., Diaz-Kommonen, L ., Kaipainen, M ., and Pietarila . J . 2003 . “Soft 
Ontologies and Similarity Cluster Tools to Facilitate Exploration and Discovery of 
Cultural Heritage Resources”, Proc. DEXA 2003, Prague, Czech Republic, 75–79 . 
doi: 10 .1109/DEXA .2003 .1232001
Beall, J . and Restall, G . 2006 . Logical Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford university Press) .
Carnap, R . 1937 . The Logical Syntax of Language (London: Kegan Paul) .
Carnap, R . 1950 . “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 4, 20–40 .
Chalmers, D . 2011 . “Verbal Disputes”, The Philosophical Review 120, 515–566 . doi: 
10 .1215/00318108–1334478 .
d’Aquin, M . 2009 . “Formally Measuring Agreement and Disagreement in Ontolo-
gies”, K-CAP ‘09 (New York: ACM), 145–152 . doi: 10 .1145/1597735 .1597761 .
Davies, P ., Newell, D ., Davies, A ., and Karagozlu, D . 2011 . “Multi-Connected On-
tologies”, CoRR abs/1112 .6090, http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1112/1112.6090.pdf 
[accessed January 14th 2017] .
Guarino, N . 1995 . “Formal Ontology, Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Rep-
resentation”, International Journal of Human and Computer Studies 43, 625–640 . 
doi:10 .1006/ijhc .1995 .1066 .
Hirsch, E . 1993 . Dividing Reality (Oxford: Oxford university Press) .
Hirsch, E . 2005 . “Physical-object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1), 67–97 . doi: 10 .1111/j .1933–
1592 .2005 .tb00506 .x .
Hirsch, E . 2009 . “Ontology and Alternative Languages”, in D . Chalmers, D . Manley, 
and R . Wasserman (eds .), Metametaphysics (Oxford: Oxford university Press), 231–
258 .
Hois, J ., Kutz, O ., Mossakowski, T ., and Bateman, J . 2010 . “Towards Ontological 
Blending”, in D . Dicheva, D . Dochev (eds .), Artificial Intelligence: Methodology, Sys-
tems, and Applications (Berlin: Springer), 263–264 .
Jenkins, C . S . I . 2014 . “Merely Verbal Disputes”, Erkenntnis 74, 11–30 . doi: 10 .1007/
s10670–013–9443–6 .
Nuopponen, A . 2014 . “Tangled Web of Concept Relations . Concept relations for 
ISO 1087–1 and ISO 704”, Terminology and Knowledge Engineering 2014, Berlin . 
<hal-01005882>, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01005882 [accessed January 14th 
2017] .
Priest, G . 2006 . Doubt Truth to be a Liar (Oxford: Oxford university Press) .
Priest, G . 2008 . “Logical pluralism hollandaise”, The Australasian Journal of Logic 6, 
210–214 .
21J . MÁCHA: Competing Ontologies and Verbal Disputes
Quine W . V . O . 1951 . “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical Review 60, 
20–43 .
Quine, W . V . O . 1960 . Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press) .
Quine, W . V . O . and ullian, J . 1970 . The Web of Belief (New York: Random 
House) .
Russell, G . 2014 . “Logical Pluralism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logical-plural-
ism/ [accessed January 14th 2017] .
Shvaiko, P . and Euzenat, J . 2013 . “Ontology Matching: State of the Art and Future 
Challenges”, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 25(1), 158–176 . 
doi: 10 .1109/TKDE .2011 .253 .
Sider, T . 2006 . “Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology”, Mind 115, 75–97 . 
doi:10 .1093/mind/fzl075 .
Smith, B . and Casati, R . 1994 . “Naive Physics: An Essay in Ontology”, Philosophical 
Psychology 7(2), 225–244 . doi: 10 .1080/09515089408573121 .
Tempich, Ch ., Pinto, H . S ., Sure, Y ., Staab, S . 2005 . “An Argumentation Ontology 
for DIstributed, Loosely-controlled and evolvInG Engineering processes of oNTolo-
gies (DILIGENT)”, in A . Gómez-Pérez, J . Euzenat (eds .), The Semantic Web: Re-
search and Applications: Second European Semantic Web Conference (Berlin: Springer), 
241–256 .
Wittgenstein, L . 1958 . Philosophical Investigations, transl . by G . E . M . Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell) .
